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PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES: NEED FOR
THE ELIMINATION OR MODIFICATION OF
THE RETENTION PROVISION
Incarceration under any conditions can be a somber experi-
ence. For twenty-two United States citizens in Lurigancho Prison
near Lima, Peru, the experience can best be described as horren-
dous. The food provided for inmates at Lurigancho is extremely
poor. The fact that there is one toilet for seventy inmates character-
izes the sanitary conditions. By any standards, Lurigancho Prison
redefines the words grim and foreboding.'
Nine Americans incarcerated in Lurigancho Prison began a
hunger strike to protest prison conditions and the long delay for
trials. One American has been waiting two and one-half years for a
trial of his drug charge.2 Upon seeing his daughter, Michael
Coyne, one of the striking Americans, was convinced to increase his
diet and "hold on for her." Coyne, charged with possession of two
and one-half grams of cocaine, faces a ten-year-to-life sentence.3 If
convicted, Coyne may be transferred to a United States federal
penitentiary pursuant to a prisoner transfer treaty.' Coyne, how-
ever, has been waiting sixteen months for a trial that has yet to be
assigned a date.'
Prior to 1976, United States citizens convicted in foreign coun-
tries had little hope of escaping the often horrible conditions that
exist in foreign prisons. The only hope for such Americans was
what little aid the United States could offer through diplomatic
1. Freed, Americans in Grim Prison Just Want a Trial, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1982, at 6,
col. 4. The Peruvian Justice minister Enrique Elias acknowledged the horrendous conditions
at Lurigancho and the severity of the problems there.
2. Id. The hunger striker's initial demands of release have been changed to a trial date
and better prison conditions.
3. Paddock, Sight of Child renews Coyne's Desire to Live, S.D. Union, Feb. 16, 1972, at
1, col. 3. Peruvian law makes no distinction in possession for sale or for one's own use. Id.
4. A prisoner transfer treaty allows a person who is convicted in a foreign country of a
criminal offense to be transferred to his home State for execution of the sentence.
5. Paddock, supra note 3, at 1, col. 3.
6. 65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 56 (1971). Prison conditions in some countries are primitive.
Overcrowding, lack of proper sanitation facilities and poor food prevail in some foreign
prisons.
1
La Grega: Prisoner Transfer Treaties: Need for the Elimination or Modificat
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
channels.7 In order to relieve these prisoners of the hardships they
encountered, the United States embarked into a novel area of for-
eign relations.8 The United States entered into several treaties to
effectuate the return of American citizens convicted in foreign
countries. 9
These treaties contain a provision which allows the State sen-
tencing the offender to retain exclusive jurisdiction over the sen-
tence.' 0 For example, once Coyne is convicted and transferred, the
United States must enforce the Peruvian sentence, even if the maxi-
mum penalty of life imprisonment is imposed."I The possible
length of Coyne's sentence poses a serious dilemma considering the
sentence Coyne would have received in one of the fifty states. In
New York, for example, possession of cocaine is a Class B felony,' 2
with a maximum of twenty-five years imprisonment and the possi-
bility of a much shorter sentence.' 3 Thus, two Americans serving
sentences in the United States for the same crime may serve signifi-
cantly different periods of incarceration because one sentence was
imposed by a foreign court.
The potential disparity of sentences is a consequence of the
7. Id. The United States Government can only seek to insure that an American ar-
rested abroad receives the same treatment as nationals of the foreign country.
8. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM.-TRANSFER OF OFFENDERS TO OR FROM FOREIGN
COUNTRIES, H.R. REP: No. 720,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 144, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3146 (statement of Mr. Christopher, Deputy Secretary, Department of State)
[hereinafter cited as House Report].
9. Prisoner Transfer, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S.
No. 8718 [hereinafter cited as Mexican Treaty]; Prisoner Transfer, Mar. 2, 1977, United
States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9522 [hereinafter cited as Canadian Treaty];
Prisoner Transfer, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, 30 U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S. No. 9219
[hereinafter cited as Bolivian Treaty]; Prisoner Transfer, June 7, 1979, United States-Tur-
key, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9898 [hereinafter cited as Turkish Treaty]; Prisoner Transfer,
July 6, 1979, United States-Peru, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9784 [hereinafter cited as Peru-
vian Treaty]; Prisoner Transfer, Jan. il, 1979, United States-Panama, - U.T.S.
T.I.A.S. No. 9897 [hereinafter cited as Panamanian Treaty].
10. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5; Bolivian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 7; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 9; Peruvian Treaty, supra note
9, art. 7; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 7.
i1. Peruvian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 7. The provision precludes the receiving State
from reviewing transferred sentences.
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16 (McKinney 1980). A person is guilty of criminal posses-
sion in the third degree when he possesses a narcotic with intent to sell. Criminal possession
in the third degree is a class B felony; however, New York law makes a distinction between
possession for sale and possession for one's own use. If Coyne were charged with the latter it
would only be a misdemeanor. Id. § 220.03.
13. Id. § 70. The maximum sentence for a class B felony is twenty-five years. The
courts may, however, fix a minimum depending upon the defendant's character and the na-
ture of the offense. The minimum is not to exceed one-third of the maximum.
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sending State retaining jurisdiction over the sentence. This Com-
ment will challenge the necessity of the retention provision on sev-
eral grounds. First, an overview will be given of the prisoner
transfer treaties to which the United States is a party.'4 This over-
view will examine the general characteristics of the treaties and,
when applicable, similarities will be noted. Constitutional issues
raised by the retention provision in the United States will then be
considered. 5 These constitutional problems may threaten the trea-
ties' viability because of possible due process and eighth amend-
ment attacks by the prisoner.
The prisoner transfer treaties to which the United States is a
party will be compared with similar treaties. 6 This comparison
will support the contention made by this Comment that the United
States treaties are the strictest on the issue of modification of the
sentence by receiving States. This discussion will be followed with
an overview of recognition and enforcement in the United States of
foreign civil judgments. The treatment foreign civil judgments re-
ceive in the United States will be contrasted with that of foreign
penal judgments under these treaties.' This comparative scrutiny
will demonstrate how the legal system of the United States provides
greater protection to United States citizens from the enforcement of
foreign civil judgments than foreign penal judgments.
This Comment does not suggest that the prisoner transfer trea-
ties be sacrificed because the sending State' 8 retains exclusive juris-
diction over the sentence. The benefits to be derived from these
treaties' 9 far outweigh the detriment suffered as a result of the re-
tention provision. The Comment will conclude, however, that the
retention provision should either be eliminated or revised. A
model provision which would allow the receiving State to modify a
transferred sentence will be suggested. By allowing the receiving
14. See infra text accompanying notes 23-80.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 81-135.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 173-95.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 196-246.
18. Sending State denotes the country in which the prisoner was convicted and sen-
tenced. Receiving State denotes the country to which the sending State transfers the
prisoner.
19. Three benefits which have been derived from the treaties are: (1) the State may
protect its interests in the treatment of its citizens abroad; (2) transferring increases the
chances for rehabilitation which is of particular importance to the State the prisoner will
eventually return; and, (3) the treaties play a significant factor in the development of close
international relations. Bassiouni, Perspectives on the Transfer of Prisoners Between the
United States and Mexico and the United States and Canada, I I VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
249, 251 (1978).
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State to modify a prisoners sentence, the model provision would
eliminate the dilemma created by the existing retention provision.2 °
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES
CURRENTLY IN FORCE
The United States is presently a party to six 2I bilateral prisoner
transfer treaties. 22 The first prisoner transfer treaty was signed with
Mexico 23 in 1976. Within the next three years, the United States
entered into similar treaties with Canada, Bolivia, Turkey, Peru
and Panama.24  The similarity of the treaties is illustrated by the
fact that the United States enacted only one piece of legislation to
implement all of the treaties.25
The treaties declare two purposes: First, each recognizes in or-
der to combat crime, mutual cooperation is necessary since the ef-
fects of crime extend beyond the borders of each State.26 Second,
in order to serve justice and combat crime more effectively, the
prisoner's social rehabilitation requires facilitation.2 7 Social reha-
bilitation may be furthered if the receiving State were allowed to
modify the sentence.28 Thus, these objectives could be advanced if
the treaties did not prevent modification by the receiving State.
Most importantly, the treaties provide a method to effectuate
the return of American citizens convicted and sentenced in foreign
20. By giving the receiving State the right to modify a transferred sentence, the result
may be a lengthened sentence. This possible result would raise legal questions in the United
States which are beyond the scope of this Comment. 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1946 (1947).
There have only been a few cases in which an appellate court has increased sentences when
there has been a clerical mistake. Id.
21. The United States and Thailand very recently signed a prisoner transfer treaty.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1982, at 4.
22. See treaties cited supra note 9.
23. House Report, supra note 8, at 3147. The Mexican Treaty was seen as an effective
means for dealing with the problem of Americans in Mexican jails. In 1975, the State De-
partment received complaints about the treatment Americans jailed in Mexico were receiv-
ing. This treaty was to be a precedent for treaties with other countries to alleviate the
problem of Americans in foreign jails. Id. at 3146-47.
24. See treaties cited supra note 9.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (Supp. IIl 1979).
26. See treaties cited supra note 9. The preambles of these treaties are essentially identi-
cal. Id.
27. Id.
28. Rehabilitation is viewed as a method to treat a disease--criminal propensity. The
objective of rehabilitation is to tailor punishment to a duration sufficient to change the of-
fenders personality and propensities. A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 19 (1978). If the
receiving State could modify the sentence, such tailoring would be better achieved because
the United States courts are more familiar with the United States prison rehabilitation pro-
grams than the foreign courts.
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countries. This humanitarian aspect was illustrated by the House
Judiciary Committee report on the implementing legislation.29 The
committee stated that the most fundamental justification for the
treaties is human rights.3" The committee recognized that incarcer-
ation in one's own country is "severe enough punishment."'" To
serve a prison term in a foreign jail creates special hardships for
prisoners. 
2
A. General Characteristics of the Treaties
The various treaties contain many of the same provisions. All
of the treaties allow the sending State to retain exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the sentence.33 The treaties also provide that a convicted
offender may not be tried again for the same offense by the receiv-
ing State. 4 All of the treaties mandate that the sentence is to be
carried out according to the laws of the receiving State. 5 Finally,
under all of the treaties, parole is governed by the laws of the re-
ceiving State. 6
There are, however, differences among the various treaties,
such as the manner in which a transfer may be initiated. Two of
the treaties call for the transfer process to be initiated by the send-
ing State.37 Three of the other treaties require the receiving State to
initiate the transfer process.3" The Canadian treaty is unique in
that it requires the prisoner to petition the sending State to com-
mence the transfer. 39 Both the Mexican and Turkish treaties allow
the prisoner to request the sending State to initiate the transfer
process. 4°




33. See supra note 10.
34. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6; Bolivian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 1; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 1; Peruvian Treaty,
supra note 9, art. 6, § 1; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 1.
35. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 1;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 20, § 1; Peruvian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2.
36. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 1;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 20, § 1; Peruvian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2.
37. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 12, § 1.
38. Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5,
§ 1; Peruvian Treaty, upra note 9, art. 5, § 1.
39. Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 3.
40. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 1; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 12, § 2.
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In contrast to the other treaties, the Turkish treaty was
modeled after the European Convention on the Validity of Crimi-
nal Judgments.4 This contrast gives rise to three differences be-
tween the Turkish treaty and the remaining treaties. 2 First, only
the Turkish treaty establishes that the receiving State may refuse to
enforce the judgment of the sending State in certain circum-
stances:4 3 If the enforcement is contrary to any fundamental legal
principles of the receiving State, or if the receiving State would be
precluded from meeting its implementing legislation, the receiving
State may refuse enforcement." Second, since Turkish penal judg-
ments may also include confiscation of property, the treaty provides
for this sanction.45 Third, the Turkish treaty states that each party
recognizes the validity of the other party's judgment. 6
Therefore, there is a major conceptual difference between the
Turkish treaty and the remaining treaties. The Turkish treaty ex-
pressly provides for recognition of foreign penal judgments. Under
the other five treaties, recognition is implicit due to the fact that the
receiving State is enforcing the penal judgment of the sending
State. 7
B. Preconditions to Transfer
The treaties specify certain conditions which must be fulfilled
before a prisoner will be eligible for transfer. The conditions are
generally the same throughout the various treaties except for minor
differences in drafting. In a few instances, however, the precondi-
tions to transfer are atypical and therefore warrant careful study of
six preconditions to transfer. 8
41. May 28, 1979, Europ. T.S., reprintedin 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 292 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Convention].
42. Comment, The Prisoner Transfer Treaty with Turkey. Last Runfor the "Midnight
Express," 84 DICK. L. REV. 687, 693 (1980).
43. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 693.
44. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 5, 21, 22. The treaty provides that if the sending
State has requested the receiving State to provisionally seize property, the receiving State
may do so when the laws of the receiving State provide for seizure for similar offenses. Also,
such seizure is to be in accordance with the laws of the receiving State and becomes the
property of that State.
45. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 21, 22. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 693.
46. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § I. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 694.
47. Comments, Execution of Foreign Sentences in the United States. 4 Treaty with Mex-
ico, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 118, 121 (1977). The remaining five treaties are silent on the issue of
recognition, but since the United States does carry out the foreign imposed sentence, the
treaties logically have such an effect.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 49-82.
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First, to be eligible for transfer, there must be "double crimi-
nality. ' '49 The prisoner's offense must be punishable in both the
receiving State and the sending State." This condition, however, is
qualified since the offense need not be described identically by the
laws of both countries. A foreign national, therefore, cannot be
transferred to the home State if the offense committed is peculiar to
the sending State.5 There are certain types of offenses which have
been excluded from these treaties. Both the Mexican and Canadian
treaties exclude immigration offenders from eligibility for trans-
fer. 2 The remaining four treaties are silent on the eligibility of im-
migration offenders. Five of the treaties exclude from transfer
eligibility those persons convicted of purely military offenses.
5 3
Both the Mexican and Turkish treaties prohibit the transfer of pris-
oners convicted for political offenses,54 and three of the treaties pro-
hibit the transfer of prisoners who have been sentenced to death. 5
Second, all of the transfer treaties require that the prisoner be
a national of the receiving State. 6 The Mexican and Turkish trea-
ties also require that the offender not be a domiciliary of the send-
ing State. 7 Thus, United States citizens who have become legally
domiciled in Turkey or Mexico are not eligible for transfer.5 8
Third, the prisoner transfer treaties require that the prisoner
have at least six months remaining on his sentence. 9 Apparently,
49. 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
§ 8, at 313 (1973).
50. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § 1; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § a;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 1; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 1; Panama-
nian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § i.
51. In view of the requirement that the offense be punishable by the laws of both States,
an offender who committed an offense which is only punishable in the would be sending
State is not eligible for transfer.
52. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § 4; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § c.
53. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § 4; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § c;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 3; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 3; Panama-
nian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 3.
54. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § 4; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, § B.
The remaining four treaties are silent on this point. Therefore, it may be assumed that a
prisoner convicted of a political offense is eligible for transfer under the remaining four
treaties.
55. Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 3;
Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 3.
56. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § B;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 2; Peruvian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2.
57. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 8.
58. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 2; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 8.
59. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § 5; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § D;
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this provision reflects one of the stated purposes of these treaties:
the offender's rehabilitation.6" The rehabilitative benefits to be de-
rived from the transfer must be balanced against the time and ex-
pense of the transfer.6 Since nine government agencies are
involved, the transfer process requires a great amount of time.62
The substantial cost of the transfers is evidenced by the estimated
$1 million to implement only two treaties during 1982.63 It has
been suggested that when less than six months remain to be served,
the time and expense far outweigh the possible benefits.'
Fourth, five of the treaties require that the sentence of the
sending State be final; all appeals must have been completed.
65
The definitional section of the Turkish treaty states that "penal
judgment means any final decision by criminal courts. 66 Since
there is no requirement of finality in the conditions of enforce-
ment,67 the Turkish treaty may be interpreted as allowing transfers
while an appeal is pending; however, no such interpretation has
appeared to date.
Fifth, all six treaties require that the offender consent to the
transfer.68 In fact, five of the treaties go so far as to provide the
receiving State the right to verify the prisoner's consent.69 Verifica-
tion of the prisoner's consent was considered to be of such import
that the United States included the procedure for verification in the
implementing legislation.70
Finally, four of the treaties require an evaluation of the pros-
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 4; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § D; Peruvian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 4; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 4.
60. See treaties cited supra note 9.
61. Abramousky & Eagle, Critical Analysis of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal
Sanction Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV. 275, 283 (1977).
62. House Report, supra note 8, at 3172 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attor-
ney General).
63. House Report, supra note 8, at 3179 (Cost Budget Office-Cost Estimate).
64. Abramousky & Eagle, supra note 61, at 284.
65. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § 6; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, § E;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 5; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 5; Panama-
nian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 5.
66. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1, § C.
67. Id. The treaty is silent on this matter.
68. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 10;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 3; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § F; Peruvian
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 9; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 6.
69. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 1; Canadian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 10;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 9; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 9; Panama-
nian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, § 6.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (Supp. III 1979); House Report, supra note 8, at 3159.
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pects for rehabilitation.7 The Turkish treaty expressly requires
that the transfer is likely to improve the prospects for the social
rehabilitation of the offender.72 The three remaining treaties de-
clare that since the objective is rehabilitation, the State should con-
sider certain factors, such as the nature of the offense, the prisoner's
criminal record and the prisoner's ties to the sending State.73
While there are some differences, the treaties are basically in
agreement as to the preconditions to transfer: (1) prisoners will not
be transferred unless they consent to the transfer;74 (2) the prisoner
must be a national of the receiving State;75 (3) the judgment must
be final;76 and, (4) there must be more than six months remaining
on the sentence.77 To determine eligibility for transfer, however,
the specific requirements of the applicable treaty must be ex-
amined. A prisoner will be eligible for transfer only when all the
required conditions exist.
The most troublesome requirement for the United States has
been the consent of the prisoner.78 This dilemma is evidenced by
the Department of Justice's anticipation of attacks on the constitu-
tionality of the consent requirement. 79 At the congressional hear-
ings on the implementing legislation, the Department of Justice
anticipated that the requirement would be held constitutional,
8 0
even though the prisoner would be waiving constitutional rights.
71. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 4; Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4; Peru-
vian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 6; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 6.
72. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4.
73. Mexican Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, § 4; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5,
§ 6; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, § 6. In addition to the factors mentioned in the
text, the treaties also call for the States to consider the offender's medical condition, strength
of his connections by residence, presence in the territory, family relations and otherwise to
the social life of the receiving and sending State. These factors are to be considered when
deciding upon the transfer of the offender as they bear upon the probability that the transfer
will contribute to the social rehabilitation of the offender.
74. See supra note 68.
75. See supra note 56.
76. See supra note 65.
77. See supra note 59.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 81-104.
79. House Report, supra note 8, at 3172 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attor-
ney General).
80. Id.
If, however, a court were to hold that the fact of transfer to the custody of the
Attorney General for the purpose of serving a sentence imposed by a foreign tribu-
nal triggers a constitutional right to test the fairness of the foreign proceeding in
either a Federal or State court, we think that the consent procedures established in
S. 1682 would be held constitutionally adequate.
1d. at 3173-74.
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C. The Consent Requirement
To be eligible for transfer, a prisoner must consent that the
transfer be subject to certain conditions. 81 One condition is that
only the courts of the sending State can hear challenges to the con-
viction or sentence.82 This condition raises serious questions since
it anticipates a waiver of constitutional rights by United States
citizens.83
In an effort to stem litigation regarding the constitutionality of
the waiver, Congress included the verification procedure in the im-
plementing legislation." The verification procedure requires the
verifying officer to inform the prisoner that the conviction or sen-
tence can only be challenged in the sending State." The verifying
officer must determine that the prisoner's consent is voluntary and
has not been coerced in any way.86 Also, the prisoner is entitled to
counsel 87 and a record is kept to determine the validity of the verifi-
cation proceeding.88
Arguably, at the time of consent to transfer, the prisoner
waives two constitutional rights. By agreeing not to challenge the
conviction in a United States court, the prisoner is waiving the right
to claim a denial of due process at trial. Second, by consenting to
the transfer, the prisoner agrees not to seek a constitutionally guar-
anteed writ of habeas corpus.89
It has been suggested that at the time the prisoner consents to
transfer, the prisoner does not possess a right of access to United
81. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (Supp. II1 1979).
82. Id.
83. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 258.
84. House Report, supra note 8, at 3160.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (Supp. III 1979). The verifying officer shall inquire of the offender
whether he understands and agrees that the transfer is subject to the following conditions:
only the country in which he was convicted and sentenced can modify or set aside the convic-
tion or sentence, and any proceeding seeking such action may only be brought in that
country.
86. Id. The verifying officer must make the necessary inquiries to make this
determination.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 4109 (Supp. III 1979). The consequences are such that Congress consid-
ered it imperative that the prisoner have counsel at the verification proceeding. The govern-
ment will supply counsel when the prisoner cannot afford one. In the case of an American,
the verifying officer will appoint counsel. House Report, supra note 8, at 3160.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (Supp. III 1979). The entire proceeding must be recorded either by
a reporter or recording equipment.
89. House Report, supra note 8, at 3174 (statement of Mr. Flaherty). For an in-depth
analysis of these constitutional issues, see generally Note, Constitutional Problems in the Exe-
cution of Foreign Penal Sentences. The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1500 (1977).
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States courts.90 Accordingly, consent which purportedly waives a
nonexistent due process right is questionable. To remedy this ques-
tionability, Congress required that the prisoner must agree not to
challenge his conviction or sentence in United States courts.9 '
Transferred prisoners, however, are not denied all access to
United States courts. In Rosado v. Civiletli, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that transferred prisoners cannot be denied
all access to United States courts. To gain access, however, the
prisoner must persuasively show he was denied any process whatso-
ever.92  Moreover, the prisoner presumably waives his constitu-
tional right to seek a writ of habeas corpus. 93 The constitutionality
of the waiver depends upon its validity.94 It has been suggested
that the treaties provide for a valid waiver of habeas corpus. Since
the consent requirement constitutes a knowing, intelligent and vol-
untary waiver, habeas corpus is constitutionally waived.95
Finally, transferred prisoners can raise an additional argument
in. relation to the consent requirement. When the prisoner consents
to transfer, the existing alternative vitiates the voluntariness of the
waiver. This argument relies on the premise that conditions in for-
eign jails are such that the prisoner has only one choice: to consent
to the transfer.96 Therefore, the consent requirement would not be
met. On the basis of this analysis, the prisoner could argue he is
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus since the treaty requirements
were not fulfilled.97
90. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2nd Cir. 1980)[hereinafter cited as Rosadol.
91. Id. at 1198.
92. Id.
93. House Report, supra note 8, at 3173 (statement of Mr. Flaherty). Mr. Flaherty ana-
lyzed the case of a transferred American to that of a prisoner to be extradited in the case of
Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). InNeeley, the Court held that the Great Writ may not
be invoked to test the fairness of a foreign proceeding. Id.
94. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. 865, 872-73 (D. Conn. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Velez].
95. Comment, supra note 42, at 710-13.
96. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 259.
97. Velez, 475 F. Supp. 865. The court released the transferred prisoners.
Petitioners initially were subjected to brutal and sustained physical torture. They
remained confinefor twenty-five months under barbaric conditions. The Mexican
prison authorities and certain powerful inmates demanded exhorbitant payments in
return for the basic fife necessities under threat of severe physical punishment. Pe-
titioners lived in perpetual fear of bodily harm. Moreover, petitioners' confinement
was the result of aborted legal proceedings which lacked any semblance of due
process guarantees. At the time their consent was procured, petitioners justifiably
believed that if they remained incarcerated any longer in Santa Marta, they would
be killed. As a result of these circumstances and in particular the fear of imminent
death, it is clear to this Court that petitioners would have signed anything, regard-
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In order to be valid, the prisoner's consent must meet the con-
stitutional standards of voluntariness.98 The Rosado court deter-
mined these standards to be similar to those governing the
voluntariness of guilty pleas.99 The Rosado court specifically
stated: "[T]he voluntariness of a given plea is to be judged by
whether it was a knowing, intelligent act 'done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences.' ",0 By applying this test, the Rosado court reversed the
lower court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to the transferred
prisoners.10' Ironically, these prisoners were certain that they
would have been killed had they not consented to the transfer.'
0 2
In summary, due to the retention of exclusive jurisdiction over
the sentence, the treaties may be subject to constitutional attack. In
addition to the foregoing arguments, it is possible that the United
States is denying United States citizens their eighth amendment
rights.'0 3 By enforcing foreign-imposed sentences with no right of
review, the United States might be subjecting its citizens to cruel
and unusual punishment.' °4
II. THE PROVISION FOR RETENTION OF EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A treaty by its nature is a contract between nations. 10 5 The
United States places treaties on a higher level than mere con-
tracts.' °6 By virtue of the supremacy clause, treaties are "the
supreme Law of the Land."'1 7 Treaties are therefore binding upon
all United States courts and are of equal force of law to the Consti-
less of the consequences, to get out of Mexico. Therefore, under the unique facts of
this case, petitioners' consents were not truly voluntary, and are therefore, invalid.
Id. at 873-74.
98. Id. at 873.
99. Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1190. The court found choices available to an American in a
foreign jail to closely resemble the choice of a criminal defendant. Both were faced with the
choice of "Whether to plead guilty and accept a set of specified sanctions ... or to stand
trial and face unknown dispositions."
100. Id. at 1191.
101. Rosado reversed the Velez decision, which held that the test for voluntariness of the
consent was the same test for voluntariness of allowing searches and seizures by policy.
102. Velez, 475 F. Supp. at 872-73.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 105-36.
105. 87 C.J.S. Treaties § i (1904).
106. Id. § 2.
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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tution." 8 If this were the only test, treaties would never be subject
to attack.
The treaty-making power is, by its terms, unlimited. °9 This
power, however, is subject to the restraints which are found in the
Constitution.110 The extent of these restraints has never been pre-
cisely defined since no treaty has ever been declared void."' The
treaty-making power cannot authorize that which the Constitution
forbids." 2 Therefore, since the Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment," 3 the United States cannot inflict such pun-
ishment under the authority of a treaty.
The prisoner transfer treaties to which the United States is a
party provide for the retention by the sending State of jurisdiction
over the sentence. Due to this retention, United States courts are
precluded from reviewing a transferred prisoner's sentence." 4 The
practical effect of this result is that United States citizens may re-
ceive and serve longer sentences than they would have if their
crimes were committed in the United States. If the prisoner's sen-
tence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the United States
is bound by the treaty to enforce the sentence.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Although the argument has not been raised, the United States
may be subjecting its citizens to cruel and unusual punishment."'
To illustrate: two men, Caban and Velez, who met aboard a flight
to Acapulco City, were arrested without warrants by men dressed
in civilian clothes." 6 Although the initial search revealed no nar-
cotics, Caban and Velez were tortured for eight days before a Mexi-
can prosecutor offered them a confession to sign.' 'i The confession
stated they were guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine. 1 8 Caban
108. 15 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 3 (1956).
109. 87 C.J.S. Treaties § 1 (1904).
110. 15 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 3 (1956).
Ill. Missouri v. Holland, 225 U.S. 416 (1920).
112. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) [hereinafter cited as Geofroy]; Asakura
v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Asakura].
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
114. See supra note 10. The provision expressly stated that only the sending State may
modify the sentence; also, the implementing act requires the verifying officer to inform the
prisoner of this. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (Supp. III 1979).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 116-36.
116. Velez, 475 F. Supp. at 867.
117. Id. at 869.
118. Id.
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and Velez refused to sign that confession, but offered their own
confession." 9 Subsequently, they were sentenced to a nine-year
imprisonment term, and were transferred to the United States pur-
suant to the Mexican treaty.
20
In contrast, the maximum sentence Caban and Velez could
have received in the United States would have been either impris-
onment for five years or a $10,000 fine, or both.' 2 ' Caban and
Velez challenged their confinement in the United States on the
ground that their consent was not voluntary.' 22 Although they did
not raise a cruel and unusual punishment argument, it was argua-
bly available.
The power of a court to punish criminals is derived from statu-
tory law. As a general rule, punishment must conform to the appli-
cable statute. 123 When a sentence is within the statutory limit, the
punishment cannot be deemed cruel and unusual 124 unless the stat-
ute itself calls for cruel and unusual punishment. 125 In the case of
Caban and Velez, however, the punishment enforced was not
within the limits of the United States conspiracy statute. Therefore,
Caban and Velez arguably were subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.
The eighth amendment was intended to limit the types of pun-
ishment which legislatures could prescribe.126 To test the constitu-
tional application of a statute under the eighth amendment, certain
factors are to be considered: (1) the nature of the offense to be
punished; (2) the legislative purpose behind the punishment; (3) the
punishment the defendant would receive in other jurisdictions; and,
(4) the punishment meted out in the same jurisdiction for other of-
fenses. 127 If, upon consideration of these factors, the punishment is
deemed excessive or greater than any previously prescribed, the
penalty may be deemed cruel and unusual.
128
The case of a transferred prisoner's sentence presents a differ-
ent situation. The punishment to which the prisoner is subjected is
119. Id.
120. Id. at 872. While Caban and Velez were sentenced to nine years, the Mexican court
reduced the sentence to eight years and nine months. ld. at 871 n. 16.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
122. Velez, 475 F. Supp. at 867.
123. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1973 (1971).
124. U.S. v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006, 1013 (10th Cir. 1974).
125. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1973 (1971).
126. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
127. Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rummell].
128. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 626 (1981).
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not prescribed by a United States penal statute. Unless the imple-
menting legislation is determined to be the operative statute, the
foregoing test should not be applicable.
The framers of the eighth amendment were primarily con-
cerned with the prevention of torture and other forms of barbarous
punishment.'29 The interpretation of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, however, has not remained stagnant. While
exact limits as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
are difficult to define, the constitutional provision forbidding such
punishment is to be liberally construed. The amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency in a ma-
turing society. 3 ° When the eighth amendment is in question, at-
tention should be focused upon the contemporary standards of
punishment and present societal values. The ultimate test of a sen-
tence's constitutionality under the eighth amendment is whether the
sentence is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the
conscience. 131
When a United States citizen is transferred pursuant to a pris-
oner transfer treaty, the United States cannot review the foreign-
imposed sentence. The United States must enforce a transferred
prisoner's sentence as imposed by the sending State. 132 As a result,
the United States may be enforcing a sentence that is so dispropor-
tionate so as to shock one's conscience. 3 3 Therefore, the United
States may be inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon its citi-
zens under such circumstances.
As a consequence to this possible challenge, it may be found
that the enforcement of a longer sentence is unconstitutional be-
cause it violates the eighth amendment. 34 Since a treaty cannot
authorize what the Constitution forbids, the United States may not
be able to enforce the treaty legally.' 35 This dilemma is increased
as a result of principles of customary international law. According
to customary international law, a treaty supersedes domestic law. '
36
129. Id.
130. Rummell, 445 U.S. 263.
131. Smith v. Municipal Court, 78 Cal. App. 3d 592, 593, 596, 144 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506
(1970).
132. See supra note 10.
133. For example, if Coyne receives the maximum life sentence from a Peruvian Court
for possession of two and one-half grams of cocaine, the United States must enforce the
sentence.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
135. Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267; Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341.
136. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1943). Treaties create
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B. The Necessity of the Retention Provision
In view of the purposes behind prisoner transfer treaties and
the rationale for the retention provision, this Comment suggests
that the retention provision is not essential. The rationale for the
exclusive jurisdiction provided by the provision is the protection of
the sending State's sovereignty' 37 and the integrity of that State's
judgments.' 38  The latter rationale is accomplished by preventing
the receiving State from interfering with the sending State's judg-
ment.' 39 Signatory States could eliminate or modify the provision
through mutual consent without endangering the integrity of the
judgments. 1 ° As a result of such action, the enforcement of the
sending State's judgments in the United States would be free from
possible constitutional attack. 4' The United States would then be
able to enforce the treaty legally.
Moreover, the rehabilitation objective would be advanced if
the receiving State could modify a transferred sentence. Rehabili-
tation calls for a tailoring of the sentence to the duration deemed
necessary in order to change the offender's personality. 4 2 Having
first hand knowledge of their prison systems and rehabilitation pro-
grams, courts of the prisoner's State could more effectively tailor
the sentence, thereby preparing the prisoner to re-enter society in
his residence State. Such a policy promotes the purpose of the trea-
ties: to facilitate the prisoner's social rehabilitation.'43
Additionally, the integrity and validity of the sending State's
judgments can be preserved. The receiving State can recognize the
sending State's judgment while altering the enforcement. 44 Thus,
binding obligations on States. It is no defense that a treaty is in conflict with domestic law.
In the event one party fails to be bound by a treaty because of a conflicting domestic law, the
treaty obligation will still exist.
137. House Report, supra note 8, at 3165. If the receiving State could modify, the States
would deem it to be an infringement upon their territorial sovereignty over crime.
138. Telephone interview with James Williams, Desk Officer for Turkey, United States
Department of State (Nov. 19, 1981).
139. Id.
140. H. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (rev. ed. 1968). It is an essential principle of
international law that no nation may release itself or revise a treaty obligation. Treaties can
be revised by mutual consent of the contracting parties by means of an amicable understand-
ing. Id. at 170.
141. If the enforcement of the sending State's judgment would constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the United States could review the sentence to make it constitutional.
142. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 28, at 34-35.
143. See treaties cited supra note 9.
144. 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 226 (1971). There is a distinc-
tion between recognition and enforcement. Therefore, a modification of the enforcement
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a United States court can recognize the sending State's judgment as
valid, while enforcing it to such an extent as to preclude the possi-
bility of constitutional attack due to a longer sentence.' 45
All of the existing treaties effect an enforcement of the sending
State's judgments. Only the Turkish treaty, however, explicitly de-
clares the judgment of the sending State is to be recognized and
enforced.' 46 The remaining five treaties implicitly effect recogni-
tion of the sending State's criminal judgments since they are
enforced by the receiving State.' 47 The distinction between recog-
nition and enforcement clearly exists, although the former is a pre-
requisite for the latter. Therefore, a judgment may be recognized
as valid by a foreign country, yet unenforceable therein.' 48 Thus, at
least in the five remaining treaties, the United States may use the
distinction as an argument to gain the right to modify a judgment.
There are several requirements for a foreign judgment to be
recognized by a United States court. First, the foreign court must
have jurisdiction. Second, there must be a full and fair trial with
regular procedures. Third, the foreign system of justice must be
likely to treat citizens and aliens alike. Finally, the judgment must
not be procured by fraud.
149
As mentioned above, only the Turkish treaty explicitly man-
dates that the receiving State must recognize the sending State's
judgments. 5 ° Since the United States enforces sentences imposed
by the remaining party States, as with Turkish judgments, all of the
treaties have the same effect in practice. Therefore, even though
the remaining five treaties do not expressly provide for recognition
of the sending State's judgments, the judgment is implicitly recog-
nized by its enforcement.
In view of the fact that the United States implicitly recognizes
does not alter the fact that the judgment was recognized; the distinction between recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments must be drawn even though the former is a prerequi-
site for the latter. Borm-Reid, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 3 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 49, 50 (1954).
145. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 226.
146. Turkish Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. "Each party in cases and under the conditions
provided for in this treaty recognizes the validity and shall enforce. . . a penal judgment."
147. Comments, supra note 47, at 121. The remaining five treaties are silent on the issue
of recognition. But because recognition is a prerequisite of enforcement, and the United
States carries out the foreign sentence, the treaties must logically effect an implicit
recognition.
148. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 226.
149. Id. at 227.
150. See supra note 146.
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the judgments of five of the sending States,' 5 ' the United States also
recognizes the existence of the prerequisites to the recognition of
judgments. When these prerequisites are met, even though implic-
itly, the judgment is valid in United States courts. Therefore, rec-
ognition of a judgment as valid should be sufficient to preserve the
integrity of the sending State's judgments.
As a result, modification of a sentence by the receiving State
should not be considered an affront to the foreign court which im-
posed the sentence. Recognition of the judgment is a statement
that the imposing court was empowered to issue the judgment, and
that it was issued according to proceedings not contrary to our
sense of justice. 52 Modification of a sentence, when the length im-
posed would be unconstitutional within the United States, would
have no effect upon the recognition of the judgment.'53 United
States courts could, by recognizing the validity of the foreign-im-
posed sentence, justify incarcerating the prisoner while shortening
the sentence. Enforcement would still be rendered by the receiving
State, even though the sentence may be modified.
To summarize, an effect of the provision has been that United
States citizens may serve longer sentences than would be imposed
by United States courts. As a result, the sentences may be subject
to constitutional attack. Since modification would only affect en-
forcement and not recognition, the receiving State could modify
judgments without affronting the integrity of the sending State's
court. 54 One rationale behind the retention provision is preserved:
protection of the integrity of a sending State's judgment. Since the
rehabilitative objective is furthered and the integrity rationale is
preserved, this Comment suggests the modification or elimination
of the retention provision.
C. Mod#iFcahion's Effect on Sovereignty
One of the primary objectives of treaties is to create rights and
obligations for the signatories.' 55 The maximum, pacta sunt ser-
151. Comments, supra note 47, at 121.
152. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 227.
153. Recognition and enforcement are two different concepts; therefore, altering the en-
forcement of the sentence should have no direct effect on the concept of recognition. 6 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 226; Borr-Reid, supra note 144, at 50.
154. See supra note 153.
155. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (1957). One rule of law gov-
erning the effect of treaties inierpares provides that unless the parties intend to create obli-
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vanda, stipulates that treaty obligations must be honored. 156 Under
the current status of prisoner transfer treaties, the United States
cannot modify a transferred sentence without breaching the treaty,
and thereby violating this fundamental principle of international
law. Upon breach, the treaty becomes voidable at the sending
State's option. 1
57
The United States, however, has always held that treaties are
modifiable by procedures agreed upon by the parties. 58 The pris-
oner transfer treaties, therefore, could be revised to allow a receiv-
ing State to modify a transferred sentence. Such a revision would
have three results. First, if a receiving State modified a transferred
sentence, that State would not be in violation of international
law.1 59 Second, this revision would act as a waiver by the sending
State of the claim that its sovereign rights are infringed upon by
modification of the sentence."6 Third, such revision would elimi-
nate the basis for the extension of the sending State's jurisdiction
into the receiving State.'
6 1
Sovereignty signifies the mutual independence of nations, and
respect for this independence is essential to the foundation of inter-
national relations. Both the principle of sovereignty in general and
territorial sovereignty in particular are fundamental in considering
questions concerning international relations.
62
One of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it must be
exercised within a State's territorial limits.163 State sovereignty and
State jurisdiction are coextensive." 64 State jurisdiction, however,
may be extended beyond a State's boundaries, whereas sovereignty
cannot. A State may exercise jurisdiction beyond its boundaries
only according to the principles of customary international law or
gations under some other legal system, the effect of their consent to the treaty given in
accordance with international law is to create rights and duties under international law.
156. H. JACOBINI, supra note 140, at 191.
157. Id. at 174. When one party violates the terms of a treaty or interprets it in a way
that essentially changes the treaty's meaning, the treaty does not automatically become void.
The treaty is only voidable.
158. G. HACKWORTH, supra note 136, at 298. The United States Ambassador to Japan
presented this position in a 1934 statement to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65.
162. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 155, at 184.
163. Id. at 187.
164. Id. at 185. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the territory is coterminous with
the sovereignty.
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treaty law. 165 The prisoner transfer treaties, by allowing the send-
ing State to retain jurisdiction, illustrate such an extension of juris-
diction. 166 Therefore, the prisoner transfer treaties do not present
an extension of State sovereignty, but of State jurisdiction.
The United States, under the existing prisoner transfer treaties,
cannot modify the foreign sentence. Revision of the treaties to al-
low the receiving State to modify a transferred sentence would not
result in an affront to either the sending State's sovereignty or juris-
diction of the sending State. By definition, sovereign States are in-
dependent and may dispose of their rights as they choose. 167 A
provision within the treaties which would allow the receiving State
to modify the sending State's judgments would evidence a waiver
of sovereign rights. A revision would also eliminate the sending
State's basis for extending jurisdiction into the receiving State.
68
Essentially, the retention of exclusive jurisdiction by the send-
ing State may create constitutional questions within the United
States. 169 The necessity of the retention provision is questionable in
view of the rationale behind the provision and the overall objec-
tives of these treaties. A revision of the retention provision, thereby
allowing the receiving State to modify a transferred sentence,
would not be an affront to the sending State's sovereignty or the
integrity of its judgments. 70 Therefore, the United States should
seek to revise the existing prisoner transfer treaties and exclude a
retention provision from any similar future treaties.'
7'
In addition to the potential constitutional dilemma, the neces-
sity of the retention provision is suspect on other grounds. There
are international precedents for recognition of foreign penal judg-
ments without the sentencing State retaining exclusive jurisdiction
over the sentence.'72 Therefore, to allow the receiving States to
modify the sentence under the prisoner transfer treaties would not
be unprecedented.
165. Id. Without these permissive rules of law, jurisdiction cannot be exercised outside
of a State's territory.
166. See supra note 10. The provision creates a permissive rule of law which allows the
sending State's jurisdiction to operate and have an effect in the receiving State.
167. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 155, at 122.
168. Id.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 81-133.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 155-68.
171. Telephone interview with James Williams, Desk Officer for Turkey, United States
Department of State (Nov. 19, 1981). The United States is currently looking into the possi-
bility of drafting and ratifying other prisoner transfer treaties.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 173-93.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENTS FOR RECOGNITION OF
FOREIGN CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS
The prisoner transfer treaties to which the United States is a
party are the first such treaties the United States has entered into;
however, they are not without international precedent. An exami-
nation of these precedents will show that the prisoner transfer trea-
ties to which the United States is a party are extreme regarding the
issue of modification of the transferred judgment.
"No State allows foreign judgments to be enforced by direct
execution without the insertion of an authoritative act of the State
in which it is to take place."17 3 The basis for this principle rests not
on the theory of sovereignty, but upon the fact that recognition in-
volves an analysis of complex legal issues. 174 Also, the require-
ments for enforcing foreign judgments differ from State to State.
Foreign judgments are enforced only by the courts of the State in
which the judgment is to be enforced.
175
Although recognition and enforcement involve complex issues,
by the nineteenth century, certain States agreed to recognize one
another's judgments. 176 In 1868, States bordering the Rhine en-
acted the "Revised Act of the Shipment of the Rhine." The courts
of these States, on the basis of reciprocity, enforced the judgments
of the courts of other States. While providing for the enforcement
only of foreign-imposed fines, this Act is still in existence and valid
today. 7 7 Even though such early precedent existed, the issue of
recognition of foreign penal judgments did not gain much impor-
tance until the mid-twentieth century. This delay was due to the
development of alternative means to control international criminal-
ity, such as extradition.
78
In March, 1948, the governments of Denmark, Norway and
Sweden entered into a convention regarding the recognition and
enforcement of criminal judgments.' 79 This treaty provides that
173. 6 M. WHITEMAN, Supra note 144, at 225.
174. Id. The requirements for recognition usually deal with the State's procedural mat-
ters. Also, there is a jurisdiction issue. There must be a permissible rule of international law
to permit an extension of one State's jurisdiction into another. I G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 155, at 184.
175. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 225.
176. M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, supra note 49, at 262.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Conventions Between the Governments of Norway, Denmark and Sweden Regard-
ing the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Criminal Matters, Mar. 8, 1949 Nor-
way-Denmark--Sweden U.N.T.S. 117.
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valid judgments imposed by one of the States in criminal matters
shall be enforceable in the other party States, insofar as the judg-
ments impose a fine, confiscation or legal costs.' Most impor-
tantly, the judgment was to be enforced by the laws of the receiving
State,' 8 ' with no retention of jurisdiction over modification of the
judgment by the sending State.
8 2
The European Convention on the Validity of Criminal Judg-
ments, s3 which is the latest and most comprehensive precedent to
date, 84 provides that the sentencing State alone has the right to
review a sentence.' 85 This convention is one of the most extensive
international agreements addressing criminal matters: it provides
for criminals not yet in custody, 86 transfer of prisoners and en-
forcement of fines.' 87 This treaty also provides for arrest of a per-
son at the request of another State 8 8 and enforcement of
judgments in absentia.189  Most importantly, the convention pro-
vides that either State may grant pardon or amnesty to the trans-
ferred offender.' 90  Therefore, there is some provision for
modification of the sentence by the receiving State. Although a
pardon or grant of amnesty goes far beyond mere reduction of the
sentence by modification, these acts essentially provide a mecha-
nism to effect a modification.
In summary, based on the analysis of the above precedents, the
six prisoner transfer treaties to which the United States is a party' 91
are extreme on the issue of modification: these treaties explicitly
mandate that the sending State alone may review the sentence.
92
These international precedents, however, either contain no such
reservation, 193 provide for review by the receiving State,'94 or es-
180. Id. art. 1.
181. Id. art. 5.
182. Id. The treaty contains no provision for the retention of any jurisdiction by the
sending State. Also, it is silent on the issue of modification of the sentence.
183. Convention, supra note 41, at 292.
184. Comment, supra note 42, at 692.
185. Convention, supra note 41, art. 10.
186. Id. art. 2. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 692.
187. Convention, supra note 41, art. 2. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 692.
188. Convention, supra note 41, art. 10.
189. Convention, supra note 41, § 3.
190. Id. art. 10. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 692.
191. See treaties cited supra note 9.
192. See supra note 10.
193. M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, supra note 49, at 262.
194. Convention, supra note 41, art. 44, § 3. The Convention states that in the case of a
judgment in absentia, the sentence may be reviewed in the enforcing State.
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sentially provide a mechanism to modify the sentence.' 95
Furthermore, the retention of exclusive jurisdiction causes an-
other important result. Retention by the sending State of jurisdic-
tion over the sentence leads to unequal treatment of foreign civil
versus foreign penal judgments by United States courts. A possible
explanation for this difference in treatment may arise from the dif-
ferent methods through which the governing laws were created:
Foreign penal judgments are recognized and enforced under statu-
tory law. Common law, however, governs the enforcement and
recognition of foreign civil judgments.
IV. PROTECTION OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES FROM FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Both liberty and property are fundamental rights to which
United States citizens are guaranteed due process by the fifth
amendment of the Constitution.196 The origins of due process ante-
date the Magna Carta.' 9 7 The importance of the principle of due
process is evidenced by its role in the development of Anglo-Amer-
ican law.'
98
The fundamental rights of liberty and property were not al-
ways deemed equivalent: the framers of the United States Consti-
tution placed a higher value on the right to property than on the
right to liberty.' 9 9 Currently, however, the constitutional emphasis
is on life and liberty. These two rights are deemed as the "basic"
rights which the Constitution was designed to safeguard.2 °° Of the
many liberties United States citizens enjoy, the sanctity of the per-
son-or the right to be free from imprisonment-is predominant.
Liberties such as speech and religion are without substance if a per-
195. Convention, supra note 41, art. 10.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
197. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 428 (L. Perry ed. 1972).
198. Id. The principle of due process furnished the basis for such famous documents as
the Petition of Right in 1628, and the Act for the Abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641.
This principle of individual liberty was included in most colonial charters or statutes. Also,
the due process principle is found in all State declarations of rights adopted prior to the
Constitution of the United States.
199. 3 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 349, at 8 (1977). It is certainly true that there is no hierarchy of rights in the Constitution,
but as far as the framers themselves were concerned, property was preeminent.
200. Id. § 347, at 4. The shift in contemporary constitutional emphasis from property to
personal rights has been the result of the social transformation of the twentieth century.
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son is imprisoned. 20  The preeminent status of the sanctity of the
person is further evidenced by the Supreme Court's expansion of
constitutional protection for persons accused of crimes. In other
words, the Court added procedural safeguards for criminal
defendants.20 2
In view of the predominance of personal liberty, the prisoner
transfer treaties create a significant dilemma. The treaties produce
a substantial delinquency in the procedural protections granted
United States citizens under the Constitution. The United States
accords its citizens far more protection against enforcement of for-
eign civil judgments than against foreign penal judgments. Due
process is essentially sacrificed when the United States enforces a
foreign penal judgment against one of its citizens. United States
citizens are not, however, deprived of all due process rights when
confronted with possible enforcement of foreign civil judgments.
20 3
A. United States Treatment of Foreign Civil Judgments
While no nation is required to recognize and enforce the judg-
ments of another nation, the principle of comity allows courts of
one nation to give effect to foreign judgments.2° Comity, accord-
ing to the United States view, is neither an absolute obligation nor
mere courtesy. 205 "[Comity] is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation having due regard to both international duty
and convenience and the rights of its own citizens or of other per-
sons who are under the protection of its laws." 2°6 Under the doc-
trine of comity, the United States recognizes and enforces civil
judgments of foreign courts.
Whereas federal law governs recognition and enforcement of
foreign criminal judgments pursuant to prisoner transfer treaties,20 7
state law governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil
201. The inviolability of the person is universally put first among the demands made by
an individual. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 33 (1959); see also 3 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
199, at 11. Unless the physical person is secure from improper restraints by the government,
all other rights are devoid of substance. Id.
202. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 2 (J. Galloway ed. 1973).
203. See in/ra text accompanying notes 204-40.
204. Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in
the United States, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 45 (1974).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (Supp. III 1979).
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judgments.2"8 The Federal Government may usurp state control in
this area either by act of Congress or by treaty; but to date, the
Federal Government has not engaged in such usurpation.2"9 The
Supreme Court has determined that federal law governs when
United States courts are determining the effect of an act of a foreign
sovereign. This rule, however, is limited to the Act of State doc-
trine.2"' The Supreme Court has not yet determined that federal
law governs recognition of foreign civil judgments. Therefore, rec-
ognition of these judgments depends upon various State laws.
Due to State control, the law governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign civil judgments has developed according to
common law. For example, the landmark case of Hilton v.
Guyot,2 1' decided in 1855, still serves as the basis for the rules gov-
erning recognition of foreign judgments.212 Basically, Hilton re-
quires that a foreign judgment sought to be enforced must have
been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, conducted in reg-
ular proceedings, and the defendants must have voluntarily ap-
peared. The legal system must provide an impartial administration
of justice for both its own citizens and aliens.2" 3 The only depar-
ture in the application of Hilton has been the elimination of reci-
procity as a requirement for recognition. 4
Another result of State control in this area is that the proce-
dure for enforcing foreign civil judgments will vary among the fifty
United States.215 There are, however, two general rules. First, the
foreign judgment must be converted to a judgment of the enforcing
American court.21 6 In view of this rule, only those remedies which
are available within that jurisdiction are available to the individual
seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment.21 7
Therefore, the legal system of the United States treats foreign
208. Mehren & Patterson, supra note 204, at 40.
209. Id.
210. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, Receiver, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
211. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) [hereinafter cited as Hilton].
212. Mehren & Patterson, supra note 204, at 45. With the exception of the requirement
of reciprocity, the Supreme Court's decision in Hilton still serves as a reasonably accurate
statement of the law in the United States with respect to the recognition of foreign-country
judgments.
213. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113.
214. Mehren & Patterson, supra note 204, at 45.
215. Mehren, Enforcement ofForeign Judgments in the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L.
401, 404-06 (1977). A consideration of the procedures and remedies available is complicated
by the fact that each State has developed its own rules governing this matter.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 404.
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civil judgments differently than foreign penal judgments. Unless
the required verification of a prisoner's consent by the United
States is equivalent to a conversion to a United States judgment, no
such conversion is required. Additionally, since they are precluded
from reviewing a transferred sentence, the courts of the United
States may be enforcing sentences that are not available under
United States law.
Thus, the United States affords greater protection to its citizens
in the enforcement of foreign civil judgments than foreign penal
judgments: Foreign civil judgments can only be enforced through
an American court, and only through such remedies as are avail-
able in that jurisdiction. 21 8 However, sentences are the State's rem-
edies for offenses against it, and are enforced against Americans,
even if the extent of that remedy would not be available in the
United States. In contrast, those seeking enforcement of foreign
civil judgments are limited to the remedies available in that juris-
diction. The prisoner transfer treaties place no such limitation on
the government enforcing foreign penal judgments.
B. The Effect of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States
Common law has developed three views regarding the effect of
foreign civil judgments in the United States.21 9 In addition, seven
states have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Rec-
ognition Act.220 This act does not create new principles of law, but
rather codifies common law.22' The act states: (1) United States
courts will give full faith and credit and comity to judgments of
foreign courts;222 (2) United States courts will not enforce a foreign
judgment if it is contrary to the public policy of the forum;223 and,
(3) foreign judgments are prima facie evidence of a claim, and a
218. See supra text accompanying notes 204-17.
219. See generally Mehren & Patterson, supra note 204.
220. Id. at 42.
221. Id.
222. Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179 (D. Fla. 1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Atlantic Ship Supply]; Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 230
F. Supp. 998 (D. Il. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Velsicoll.
223. Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominican de Aviacion, 566 F.2d 611 (C.A. Puerto Rico
1977); see also UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT. The act has
been adopted by seven States: California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
York and Oklahoma. The act provides that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if the
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defendant can raise any and all possible defenses. 224
The United States is comprised of multiple sovereign 225 juris-
dictions, and therefore faces inevitable problems in recognition of
foreign judgments.226 Article IV of the United States Constitution
resolved this problem by declaring that courts of one state shall
give full faith and credit to judgments of another state. 227 Although
article IV does not include foreign judgments, by analogy courts
have given full faith and credit to foreign imposed judgments.228
Within the United States, a civil judgment of a sister state
which is enforced is still subject to collateral attack on several
grounds in the enforcing State.229 Although an American court
may accord full faith and credit to a foreign civil judgment, that
judgment may still be attacked. United States citizens transferred
pursuant to the prisoner transfer treaties, however, may not attack
their sentence23° if they were afforded "any process whatsoever. 231
The implementing legislation requires the prisoner's consent to
subject the transfer to the conditions of the applicable treaty.232
Since one of the conditions is that the sending State retain exclusive
jurisdiction over the sentence, the prisoner is denied the opportu-
nity to collaterally attack the sentence.233 Therefore, United States
citizens have greater protection against enforcement of foreign civil
judgments than penal judgments in that the former may be collater-
ally attacked in a jurisdiction expounding the view that foreign
judgments are given full faith and credit.
Moreover, under the second view, an American court could
refuse to enforce a foreign civil judgment if it would prove contrary
to the public policy of the forum.234 The Uniform Recognition Act
224. Svenska Handelsbanker v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Carlson].
225. Sovereign is not used here in its international law sense.
226. Mehren, supra note 215, at 401.
227. U.S. CONST. art IV.
228. See cases cited supra note 222. In Atlantic Ship Supply, the court held that a Costa
Rican judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. Atlantic Ship Supply, 392 F. .Supp. at
183. In Velsicol, the court stated that "generally as a matter of comity, the judgment of a
foreign court is given conclusive effect and full faith and credit in United States courts."
Velsicol, 230 F. Supp. at 1018.
229. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 416 (1947). As a general rule, a judgment may be collaterally
attacked where it is void because of fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (Supp. III 1979).
231. Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1179 (emphasis added).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (Supp. III 1979).
233. See supra note 10.
234. Mehren, supra note 215, at 61.
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also incorporates this view as one of the grounds for denying en-
forcement of foreign civil judgments.235 The public policy standard
considers whether the foreign proceeding was conducted in a man-
ner significantly offensive to the State's notions of fairness or pol-
icy.236 Therefore, American courts may deny enforcement to
foreign civil judgments if the foreign procedure denies an Ameri-
can certain procedural rights, a denial of which could be deemed
unfair.
On the basis of this analysis, American citizens are afforded
more protection against foreign civil judgments than foreign penal
judgments. An American judge cannot refuse to enforce a foreign
sentence against an American prisoner. Essentially, public policy
determines the length of sentences imposed for specific offenses,
237
but the United States cannot review or modify exhorbitantly long
foreign-imposed sentences. Sentences must be enforced even if
contrary to the domestic policy of the receiving State.
Furthermore, the third view provides considerably more pro-
tection to United States citizens from enforcement of foreign civil
judgments than foreign penal judgments. Under this view, foreign
civil judgments are only prima facie evidence of a claim, and a de-
fendant may raise any defense in his behalf.238 Under prisoner
transfer treaties, the foreign conviction is conclusive. Further, it
may be determined that the prisoner has waived even the most ba-
sic constitutional right to due process.239
To summarize, each of the three views affords United States
citizens more protection from the enforcement of foreign civil judg-
ments than foreign penal judgments.24 ° When an American is
transferred, his conviction is conclusive.24' United States courts,
however, can question a foreign civil judgment on several grounds.
Due process is not sacrificed for civil judgments, whereas it is sacri-
ficed for penal judgments. Also, those seeking to enforce a foreign
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Depending on the State, the determination of the sentence is to some extent discre-
tionary with the trial judge. Some of the relevant criteria relate to criminal law objectives
such as rehabilitation and community protection. Closely related to these criteria are con-
cern for the community attitude and the likelihood that certain decisions may alienate the
community, causing a loss of support for the correctional system. R. DAWSON. SENTENCING
171-72 (1969).
238. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. at 448.
239. Rosada, 621 F.2d at 1179.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 222-40.
241. See supra note 10.
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civil judgment are limited to the remedies available in the forum.
No such limitation is imposed on penal judgments.2 42
The resulting imbalance between the amount of protection af-
forded to a defendant from foreign civil judgments and foreign pe-
nal judgments presents a strange anomaly. Personal liberty is
viewed today as the most important of constitutional rights.24 3 The
United States, however, protects Americans' property rights from
foreign judgments to a greater extent than Americans' personal lib-
erty. In view of the predominance of personal liberties among fun-
damental rights, the resulting disparity is extremely suspect.
Therefore, an American's right to personal liberty should at least
receive protection equivalent to the protection accorded to an
American's property rights.
Equivalent protection of these rights is impossible in view of
the current status of the prisoner transfer treaties. The courts of the
United States cannot review a transferred sentence or conviction. 2 "
United States courts, however, can question a foreign civil judg-
ment on several grounds.24 5 A revision of the treaties to allow
United States courts to review and modify the sentence would elim-
inate the existing imbalance.
V. CONCLUSION
There are four viable arguments against the retention of exclu-
sive jurisdiction by the sending State. First, the retention provision
creates constitutional problems in the United States. Second, there
are no transfer treaties between other nations which serve as prece-
dent for transfer of penal judgments without the retention of juris-
diction by the sending State. Finally, the retention provision causes
a delinquency in the protection which United States citizens receive
from the enforcement of foreign penal judgments as opposed to
civil judgments. Therefore, the retention provision should be elimi-
nated or modified.
The retention provision precludes courts of the United States
from hearing due process claims unless the prisoner is denied "any
process whatsoever." Thus, if the foreign proceeding provides even
a minimal amount of process, a United States court will not hear an
attack of the transferred sentence. Even if the process the prisoner
242. See supra text accompanying notes 204-40.
243. Commentary, supra note 199, at 4.
244. See supra note 10.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
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received falls far below our standards of due process, his sentence is
conclusive. 24
Additionally, there are transfer treaties which do not include
the retention of jurisdiction by the sending State. The prisoner
transfer treaties to which the United States is a party are more
stringent on this issue than other transfer treaties. Therefore, the
retention of exclusive jurisdiction must not be essential to a pris-
oner transfer treaty.247
Most importantly, the retention provision causes significantly
different treatment of foreign civil judgment and foreign penal
judgments in the United States. Prisoners transferred pursuant to
the treaties waive any due process claims. United States citizens,
however, can attack a foreign civil judgment if they are denied due
process. This delinquency in due process rights is suspect in view
of the preeminence of liberty in the United States.248
It is not suggested that the treaties be sacrificed due to the fact
that the receiving State cannot modify the sentence. For the first
time, these treaties provide a way for American citizens to escape
the hardship of serving foreign prison sentences. The treaties work
to facilitate the offender's possibility for rehabilitation. Also, the
treaties present a framework for greater international assistance in
judicial matters. Thus, the treaties are extremely beneficial to both
the States involved and the offender himself. Rather, it is the reten-
tion of jurisdiction over the modification of sentences that presents
an obstacle to a more effective means to achieve the same ends
desired.
Therefore, should the United States enter into or negotiate any
future prisoner transfer treaties, the provision in question should
not be included. In the alternative, the suggested modification
could be substituted. This Comment proposes the following modi-
fication which would allow the receiving State to modify the sen-
tence imposed by the foreign court. The offender would then only
serve the length of time that would have been imposed by a United
States judge.
The proposed modification should read as follows: The send-
ing State, by transferring the prisoner, relinquishes any claim to
jurisdiction over the transferred prisoner's sentence. The receiving
State may unilaterally, when the interests of justice and the rehabil-
246. See supra text accompanying notes 81-141.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 173.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 196-247.
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itation process would be better served, modify the sentence in ac-
cord with sentences issued for similar crimes by the courts of that
State.
Donald J La Grega, Jr.
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